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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20050136-CA

vs.
CHRISTINA L. AND MARK J. GRAY,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendants appeal their conviction for child abuse, a second felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2)(a) (West 2004), in the Third Judicial District Court in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robin W. Reese presiding. This Court has
jurisdiction to consider the petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issues 1 and 2: Were defendants' trial attorneys ineffective in (1) not requesting a
lesser-included offense instruction and (2) not retaining an expert to provide psychiatric
testimony on the mental states of both defendants?
Standard of Review for Both Issues: Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised
for the first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25,16, 89
P.3d 162.
1

Issue 3: Did instructing the jury that "[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree
of proof that. .. obviates all reasonable doubt" violate defendant's due process rights?
Standard of Review: "Whether [a jury] instruction correctly states the law is
reviewable under a correction of error standard, with no particular deference given to the trial
court's ruling." State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232,1244 (Utah 1993) (footnote omitted), cert,
denied, 510 U.S. 979(1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (West 2004):
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or,
having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits another to
inflict serious physical injury upon a child is guilty of an offense as
follows:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the
second degree;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree; or
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (West 2004):
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature
of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly,
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or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants, Christina L. Gray and Mark J. Gray ("defendants" or "the Grays"),
were charged with child abuse, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 765-109 (West 2004). CGP at 4; MGP at 5.l A jury found them guilty as charged. CGP at 83;
MGP at 74. The trial court sentenced each of them to an indeterminate prison term of one to
fifteen years. CGP at 123-125; MGP at 113-115. The court suspended the prison terms,
placed them on probation for three years, and ordered each of them to serve a six-month jail
term. Id. The court ordered that Christina begin serving her jail term on January 17, 2005,
and that Mark begin serving his term on July 15, 2005. Id.

1

The State refers to the pleadings volume in Christina Gray's case as CGP, the
pleadings volume in Mark Gray's case as MGP and the trial transcripts as TT.
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Chained in the basement, u[a]ll day and all night"
J.G. was 10 or 11 years old when his father, Mark Gray, and stepmother, Christina
Gray, began chaining him to a cinder block on the cement floor in the basement of their
Magna home. TT 118, 138-39,233-35. While defendants released J.G. to go to school and
to come upstairs for his meals, he spent a large amount of his time in restraints. TT 234-236,
241. J.G. testified that his father sometimes took him upstairs to eat, but that he otherwise
spent "[a] 11 day and all night" chained in the basement. TT 236. Defendants often kept him
in his underwear on the cement floor of the laundry room hallway with access to little more
than a rug and a blanket. TT 239-40.
J.G. claimed that Christina sometimes threw water and turned a fan on him while he
was chained and that she sometimes hit and kicked him. TT 239,241. He also claimed that
Christina struck him with a board, and threw jalapeno pepper juice in his eyes. TT 241-42,
270. He told the jury that when the family went to a drive-in movie, Christina would
sometimes put a sheet over his head so he could not see the screen. TT 246. "She says she
hates me." TT 242.
J.G. claimed Christina repeatedly stabbed at him with a fork and showed one
investigator a scar with four dots, three in a line and one slightly offset. TT 160. The
investigator stated that the dots were consistent with a fork. Id, J.G. pointed to the
unaligned dot and explained that one prong of the fork was bent. Id.

4

J.G. also told the investigator that he had hidden ajar of peanut butter in the basement
because he "was hungry and Christina wasn't feeding [him]." TT 134,237. During a later
search, the investigator found the jar where J.G. said he had placed it, "a place where you
couldn't get to unless he described it." TT 160.
Tic-tac-toe
Numerous witnesses confirmed that J.G. was in fact chained in the basement. Family
friend Alyce Johnson first saw him chained in the basement in the summer of 2002. TT 3738. When Alyce went to the Gray home eight months later, she saw J.G. in the living room,
"sitting at the table." TT 44. "[H]e didn't have a shirt on and he had tic-tac-toe on his face
and he had writing across his back." Id. He was "embarrassed because [he was] in his
underwear and his feet [were] handcuffed." TT 45. Christina told her that the writing on
J.G.'s back was his address. TT 53. Christina said that Colleena, a teenager who lived with
the family, had put the tic-tac-toe on J.G.'s face. TT 57. Christina said that Colleena "likes
to cause problems." Id.
In approximately September 2003, Alyce again saw J.G. in the basement. He was
sitting in the hallway area in his underwear. TT 46. He had "a dirty pillow next to him,
some books next to him and a chain on his ankle." TT 47. This time, Alyce called child
protective services. Id.

2

Colleena denied that she had written the tic-tac-toe sign. TT 422.
5

J. G. is taken into custody
On October 1, 2003, patrol officer Michael Lee went to the Gray home and asked to
speak to J.G.'s parents. TT 73, 75. When told that the parents were not home, Officer Lee
asked to see J.G. Id. A teenage girl invited the officer in and went to get J.G. Id. When she
returned with J.G., she had a pair of handcuffs in her hands. TT 76. The detective also went
to the basement where he found a piece of chain connected to a cinderblock in a hallway near
the laundry room. TT 82-83. He saw a braided rug, a thin pillow, some books, and a towel,
but no blankets or mattress. TT 83, 85. When he asked the children "what [the area] was
for," they told him "that's where they had to chain up [J.G.] because he ran away." TT 86.
Defendant Mark Gray admitted to Detective Lee that he and Christina used a chain to
restrain J.G. See TT 87,159. Mark or Christina said that "Deputy [James] Timpson had told
them that that's what they needed to do, is chain him up with handcuffs." Id. at 94. Mark
told Detective Lee that they had been handcuffing J.G. for "about a month." Id. at 98. This
was over a year after Alyce had first observed J.G. in chains and Christina had told her that
he "had come home from running away and that she had chained him down in the
basement." TT 37-38. Christina and Mark had also told their friend and neighbor Jean
Woolston about the chaining. TT 456. They said that "[J.G.] ran away all the time and they
didn't know what to do." Id. As Deputy Lee placed J.G. in the patrol car for transport,

3

When Deputy Timson testified, he denied that he had a discussion with defendants
about chaining J.G. TT308.
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neither defendant hugged him. TT 88,102. As J.G. was leaving, Mark Gray tapped him on
the shoulder and said "Goodbye, Jeff." TT 103. Christina Gray did nothing. Id.
Defendants' story
Defendants claimed that they kept J.G. in his underwear to prevent his running away.
TT 314. J.G. had academic and behavioral difficulties at school. See TT 323-389 (testimony
of school resource teacher, school social worker, school principal). At home, "he was hard
to deal with" and "made .. .life miserable." TT 41. Christina told her friend that she hated
J.G. TT 40. J.G. ran away repeatedly. TT 253. Defendants attempted to control his
behavior in various ways, but eventually determined to restrain him.
Teachers, social workers and even the principal at J.G.'s elementary school all
testified to his discipline problems and propensity for running away. See, e.g., TT 330,347,
362. The school's principal ranked J.G.'s disciplinary problems as "among my top three" in
11 years of school administration. TT 371. The principal also described the Grays as "very
good. They recognized the problem." TT 359. "They were very responsive to a kid that
was in crisis." TT 380. A neighbor described Christina Gray as a normal "stay-at-home
mom[]" who treated J.G. just like the other children. TT 447, 449-51.
Coleena Norman, a teenager who lived with the Grays for about six months in 2003,
testified that J.G. was chained intermittently over a three-month period and only when adults
were not present to prevent him from running away. TT 423. Jason Kass, another family
friend who lived for a time with the Grays, stated that he saw J.G. chained "very few times."
TT 431. He also testified that he never saw Christina beat or stab J.G. and that when she did
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punish him it was only by taking privileges away. TT 432. He also said that he had
accompanied the Gray family to the drive-in and that he never saw Christina place a blanket
or towel over J.G.'s head. TT 434.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Defendants' trial attorneys were not ineffective for not requesting a lesserincluded offense jury instruction on class A misdemeanor child abuse. First, trial counsels'
performance evinces a legitimate trial strategy—gaining acquittal for their clients—and
therefore cannot support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Second, the defendants
were not entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction because the evidence did not
support an acquittal on the greater charge and a conviction on the lesser. Third, defendants
suffered no prejudice because they would have been convicted of felony child abuse even if
the instruction had been given.
Point II: Defendants' trial attorneys were not ineffective in not presenting expert
testimony on their mental states. First, testimony on the mens rea of a defendant at the time
of the offense is inadmissible under the rules of evidence. Second, counsel's decisions
concerning which witnesses to call for trial are classic strategic decisions that cannot support
a claim of ineffective assistance.
Point III: The jury instruction on reasonable doubt correctly states the law, even
though it uses the phrase "obviates all reasonable doubt." First, defendants cannot pursue
this claim on appeal because any error was invited through defense counsel's affirmation of
the jury instructions. Second, defendants cannot raise this claim for the first time on appeal.
8

Because they cannot demonstrate exceptional circumstances warranting review of an
unpreserved claim, it should not be considered. Third, even on the merits, this claim fails
because the prosecutor did not misstate the burden of proof by arguing that the State need
only obviate doubts that are "sufficiently defined." Finally, the instructions, taken as a
whole, properly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS'
TRIAL
ATTORNEYS
WERE
NOT
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT REQUESTING A LESSERINCLUDED OFFENSE JURY INSTRUCTION.

Defendants argue that they received ineffective assistance because their trial attorneys
did not request a lesser-included offense jury instruction. Aplt. Br. at 29. This claim fails.
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish both prongs of
the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), whichholds that
such claims succeed only if the defendant demonstrates: (1) that his counsel's performance
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) that counsel's performance
prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 687-88; see also State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah
App.1994). A defendant's burden is extremely high. An ineffective assistance claim can
"succeed[ ] only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from
counsel's actions." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah App.1995) (citation and
quotations omitted). Moreover, "proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a
speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870,
877 (Utah 1993) (footnote citations omitted).
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When a defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel, it is not enough to show
that his or her counsel's performance could have been better. The Sixth Amendment entitles
a criminal defendant "only to effective assistance of counsel, not to the best or most
complete representation available." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1259 (Utah 1993); see
also Boydv. Ward, 179 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 1999) (counsel's performance is deficient
only if petitioner shows it was "completely unreasonable, not merely wrong").
As demonstrated below, defendants do not meet their burden to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel.
A,

Trial Counsel's Performance Was Not Deficient Because It
Reflected a Legitimate Trial Strategy.

Defendants' claim that their trial attorneys were deficient because they did not request
a lesser-included offense instruction is refuted by the fact that counsel's performance at trial
evince a legitimate trial strategy—to gain acquittal for their clients.
A decision to seek acquittal rather than face the risk of conviction on a lesser-included
offense is a reasonable trial strategy. See, e.g.. State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 723 (Utah App.
1997) (counsel's decision not to request a lesser-included offense instruction consistent with
trial strategy and does not constitute ineffective assistance), cert, denied 953 P.2d 449 (Utah
1998); Benefieldv. State, 557 S.E.2d 476,478-79 (Ga. App. 2001) ("Counsel's decision not
to request a jury charge on a lesser included offense and to pursue an 'all or nothing' defense
is a matter of trial strategy and does not amount to ineffective assistance"); State v. Griffie,
658 N.E.2d 764, 765 (Ohio 1996) ("[f]ailure to request jury instructions on lesser-included
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offenses is a matter of trial strategy and does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel")
(citation omitted).
In State v. Hall, this Court considered a claim of ineffective assistance by a defendant
who had been convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Hall, 946 P.2d at 715. Hall
claimed on appeal that his attorney's performance was deficient because he should have
requested jury instructions on certain lesser-included offenses. Id. This Court had no
difficulty disposing of Hall's claim because requesting a lesser-included offense would
contradict the defense's theory of the case, i.e., that the charges were fabricated:
Defense counsel's failure to request the instructions . . . is entirely consistent
with his trial strategy. Defense counsel argued throughout trial that A.C. was
lying about the alleged abuse, and suggested that A.C.'s mother had devised
the allegations. Thus, defense counsel's request for instructions on lesser
included offenses would have been inconsistent with his assertion that
defendant never touched A.C.
M a t 723.
Similarly, here, defendants' strategy was that they were blameless. Part of that
strategy involved attacking J.G.'s credibility by suggesting through the testimony of various
witnesses that he was lying or at least exaggerating his allegations against his parents. J.G.
testified that he was chained to a cinder block on the floor in the basement hallway "for a
long time," " all day and all night." TT 235-36. He claimed Christina, his stepmother, beat
him, stabbed him with a fork, placed a sheet over his head at a drive-in movie so he could
not see and forced him to sleep on the floor in water with a fan blowing on him. TT 239,
241, 242, 246. The defense disputed these allegations through testimony from family
friends. For example, Coleena Norman, a teenager who lived with the Grays for about six
11

months in 2003, testified that J.G. was chained only intermittently over a three-month period
and only when adults were not present to prevent him from running away. TT 423. Jason
Kass, another family friend who lived for a time with the Grays, stated that he saw J.G.
chained "very few times." TT 431. He also testified that he never saw Christina beat or stab
J.G. and that when she did punish him it was only by taking privileges away. TT 432. He
also said that he had accompanied the Gray family to the drive-in and that he never saw
Christina place a blanket or towel over J.G.'s head. TT 434.
Defendants' "all or nothing" strategy was also evident in their attempts to advance a
"mistake of law" defense by arguing that they honestly and reasonably believed they were
acting responsibly and legally in restraining J.G. to prevent him from running away.
Defendants claim their belief was reasonable because Salt Lake County Sheriffs Deputy
James Timpson, who met with the Grays early on to discuss methods to keep J.G. from
running away, allegedly endorsed the chaining. See, e.g., TT 491-92. Deputy Timpson
denied making such a statement, TT 309, but defendants' version was at least partially
corroborated by Ernest Broderick, J.G.'s school principal, who was present during the
meeting with Timpson. According to Broderick, Christina told Timpson that J.G. was so fast
that she felt like she "almost needed to handcuff him to [her]." TT 365. Broderick recalled
Timpson telling Christina that handcuffing J.G. to her would "probably be reasonable under
those circumstances and I believe I agreed with it too... ." TT 365-66.
The "mistake of law" defense was also embodied in Jury Instruction 20, which states:
You are instructed that ignorance or mistake concerning the existence of a
penal law is no defense to a crime unless:
12

1. Due to his or her ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably
believed his or her conduct did not constitute an offense, and
2. His or her ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable
reliance upon:
a.

An official statement of the law contained in a written
order or grant of permission by an administrative agency
charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the
law in question;
or

b.

A written interpretation of the law contained in an
opinion of a court of record or made by a public servant
charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the
law in question.

MGP 96; CGP 105.
Finally, this strategy was also evident in the defendants' attempts to portray
themselves as earnest, caring parents who were at their wits' end in attempting to deal with a
child who was deeply disturbed due to the abuse inflicted on him by his birth mother, who
had custody of him until he was five years old. Teachers, social workers and even the
principal at J.G.'s elementary school all testified to his discipline problems and propensity
for running away. See, e.g., TT 330, 347, 362. The school's principal ranked J.G.'s
disciplinary problems as "among my top three" in 11 years of school administration. TT
371. The principal also described the Grays as "very good. They recognized the problem."
TT 359. "They were very responsive to a kid that was in crisis." TT 380. A neighbor
described Christina Gray as a normal "stay-at-home mom[]" who treated J.G. just like the
other children. TT 447, 449-51.
13

Clearly, counsel's trial strategy was to have their clients exonerated. Through
testimony of houseguests, neighbors and school officials, the Grays attempted to portray
themselves as concerned parents coping as best they could with a disturbed child. Testimony
concerning J.G.'s alleged propensity to lie or exaggerate and the alleged alleaged
endorsement of chaining J.G. to restrain him both suggest a defense strategy aimed at the
entirely reasonable goal of acquittal. A lesser-included offense instruction would have been
inconsistent with this strategy because it would entail an admission of guilt. Because the
performance of the defense attorneys reflects a reasonable trial strategy, they cannot be
found ineffective for taking actions that would be inconsistent with that strategy.
B.

The Defendants Have Not Shown Prejudice From Their Counsel's
Alleged Deficient Performance Where They Have Not
Demonstrated That (1) They Were Entitled to the Lesser-included
Offense Instruction or (2) There Is a Reasonable Probability of a
Different Result If the Instruction Had Been Given.

Defendants have not shown prejudice. Defendants claim the jury should have been
given the lesser-included offense instruction because jurors should have been given the
option of convicting them of class A misdemeanor child abuse, an offense they now believe
would have been more appropriate because they believed that chaining J.G. in the basement
was necessary to keep him from harming himself by running away. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 32.
Thus, they claim their attorneys erred in not requesting a lesser-included offense instruction.
This argument fails, first, because they were not entitled to the lesser-included offense
instruction and, second, because the Grays would still have been convicted of felony child
abuse even if the instruction had been given.

14

In Utah, "[a] defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant
under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such
provision;..." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (West 2004). A defendant may be convicted
of a charged offense or a lesser-included offense, but not both. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1402(3) (West 2004). An offense is a lesser-included offense if "[i]t is established by proof of
the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense
charged;.. ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a) (West 2004).
When a defendant requests a lesser-included offense instruction, the trial court need
not grant the request "unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of
the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1402(4) (West 2004). Thus, to make this determination, the trial court must perform a twopart analysis. "First, the trial court must determine whether the offense for which the
defendant seeks instruction is a lesser included offense of the crime charged

Second, the

trial court must determine whether a rational basis exists on which the jury could acquit the
defendant of the offense charged and convict of the lesser offense." State v. Payne, 964 P.2d
327, 332 (Utah App. 1998) (citing State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983) (additional
citations omitted)).
But even if there is a rational basis for the instruction, reversal is not required if the
defendants suffered no prejudice. Id. at 334. "For an error to require reversal, 'the likelihood
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of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict.'"
State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898,902 (Utah App. 1996) (quotingState v. Knight, 734P.2d913,
920 (Utah 1987)). Reversal is inappropriate when compelling evidence supports the
conviction. Payne, 964 P.2d at 334.
At trial, defendants readily admitted that they had chained J.G. to a brick in the
basement. Indeed, as they acknowledge in their brief, they were quick to admit to their
conduct, even after they were given their Miranda warnings by investigating officers. See,
e.g., Aplt. Br. at 25.4 The defendants' fundamental strategy at trial was that they honestly
believed they were justified in chaining J.G. to keep him from running away; in fact, they
went so far as to claim that Deputy Timpson told them chaining was warranted under the
circumstances. See, e.g., TT 94.
On appeal, defendants claim that the jury should have been given a lesser-included
offense instruction on class A misdemeanor child abuse, which is committed by infliction of

However, although both defendants acknowledged chaining J.G. in the basement,
they both consistently minimized the extent of their conduct. For example, when first
confronted by Deputy Lee in the fall of 2003 about the chaining, Mark Gray stated that they
had only been chaining J.G. for about a month. TT 98. This testimony is inconsistent with
J.G.'s own testimony as well as that of other witnesses, such as Alyce Johnson, who testified
that she saw J.G. chained in the summer of 2002. TT 37-38. Additionally, Christina Gray
later acknowledged that "I made a mistake when I supported Mark's decision to use the
chain" and that she felt guilty about using the chain. See Parenting of Mark and Christina
Grey, MGP 112, at 2.
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serious physical injury upon a child through criminal negligence.5 Utah Code Ann. § 76-5109(2)(c) (West 2004). Under Utah law, a person is criminally negligent regarding
"circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes
a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (West
2004).
By contrast, a defendant commits second degree felony child abuse if he or she
intentionally or knowingly inflicts serious physical injury upon a child. Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-109(2)(a) (West 2004); see also, e.g., Jury Instruction 16 (MGP 92, CGP 101). The
terms "intentionally" and "knowingly" are defined as follows:
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

5

"Serious physical injury" is "any physical injury or set of injuries which seriously
impairs the child's health, or which involves physical torture or causes serious emotional
harm to the child, or which involves a substantial risk of death..." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5109(l)(d) (West 2004). "Serious physical injury" includes "any conduct toward a child
which results in severe emotional harm, severe developmental delay or retardation, or severe
impairment of the child's ability to function," Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109( 1 )(d)(vii) (West
2004), and "any conduct which results in starvation or failure to thrive or malnutrition that
jeopardizes the child's life." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(l)(d)(x) (West 2004).
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(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103. According to the Utah Supreme Court, intentional or willful
"means to act deliberately and purposefully, as distinguished from merely accidentally or
inadvertently . . . Willful, when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted,
implies a willingness to commit the act.... Willful does not require an intent to violate the
law or to injure another or acquire any advantage" State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1358
n.3 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted; emphasis added); see also State v. Norton, 2003 UT App
88, ^| 20, 67 P.3d 1050 (defendant need not intend to violate the law; rather, he need only
intend to "do the prohibited act"). Similarly, "a person does not need to 'form the intent to
commit a specific crime or intend the result that occurred to be found guilty of knowingly
committing a crime.5" State v. Ottwell, 779 P.2d 500, 504 (Mont. 1989) (citation omitted).
If defendants' attorneys had requested a jury instruction on misdemeanor child abuse,
the trial court first had to determine whether it was a lesser-included offense. Class A
misdemeanor child abuse is a lesser-included offense because its elements are identical to
second-degree felony child abuse, except for the element of intent. See State v. Carruth,
1999 UT 107, \ 16, n.9, 993 P.2d 869 ("'the distinction between the [greater and lesser
offense] must be based upon the degree of risk or injury to person or property or upon grades
of intent or degrees of culpability5") (quoting McElhanon v. State, 948 S.W.2d 89, 91 (Ark.
1997)). Thus, if a lesser-included offense had been requested, the trial court would have had
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to "' decide whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence presented to justify sending the
question to the jury.'" State v. Knight, 2003 UT App 354, ^ 10, 79 P.3d 969) (quoting State
v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 160 (Utah 1983)), cert denied 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 2004). "'[W]hen
the evidence is ambiguous and therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one
alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense and conviction of the lesser, a jury
question exists and the court must give a lesser included offense instruction at the request of
the defendant." Id. (brackets in original).
The evidence supporting the convictions of second degree felony child abuse or that
the defendants acted intentionally or knowingly was very strong. Numerous people testified
to the fact that J.G. was chained to a cinder block in the basement; many witnesses had seen
him firsthand. See, e.g., TT 38, 45, 76 (Alyce Johnson), 76, 77, 82 (Deputy Lee), 423
(Colleena Norman), 431 -32 (Jason Kass). Additionally, the chain, cinderblock, the rug upon
which J.G. slept were all seized by police and offered into evidence at trial. TT 115, 133,
165-171. Some investigators also testified to seeing marks on J.G.'s ankles. TT 109, 163.
J.G. testified that although he was released to go to school and to come upstairs for his
meals, he spent a large amount of his time in restraints. TT 234-236, 241. He also testified
that his father sometimes took him upstairs to eat, but that he otherwise spent "[a] 11 day and
all night" chained in the basement. TT 236. Defendants often kept him in his underwear on
the cement floor of the laundry room hallway with access to little more than a rug and a
blanket. TT 239-40. J.G. claimed that Christina sometimes threw water and turned a fan on
him while he was chained and that she sometimes hit and kicked him. TT 239,270. He also
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claimed that Christina struck him with a board, repeatedly stabbed at him with a fork, and
threw jalapeno pepper juice in his eyes. TT 241-42, 270.
Other evidence corroborated his testimony. J.G. showed one investigator a scar with
four dots, three in a line and one slightly offset. TT 160. The investigator stated that the
dots were consistent with a fork. Id. J.G. pointed to the unaligned dot and explained that
one prong of the fork was bent. Id. J.G. also told the investigator that he had hidden ajar of
peanut butter in the basement because he "was hungry and Christina wasn't feeding [him]."
TT 134, 237. During a later search, the investigator found the jar where J.G. said he had
placed it, "a place where you couldn't get to unless he described it." TT 160.
As to the length of time J.G. was chained, Alyce Johnson, a family friend, testified to
seeing J.G. chained to a cinder block in the basement as early as summer 2002. TT 37-38.
More than a year later, Deputy Michael Lee responded to the Gray residence and found only
children at home alone. TT 75. When he asked to see J.G., a 13-year-old girl eventually
produced him and a pair of handcuffs.

TT 76. One of the children also candidly

acknowledged that the handcuffs were used to chain J.G. in the basement. TT 86. Deputy
Lee testified that he went into the basement of the home and found in the hallway a cinder
block, a chain, a braided rug over the cement floor, a thin pillow and a towel. TT 77, 82-85.
A week later, police returned with a search warrant and seized the block, chain, rug and
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pillow, many of which had been moved to various places around the home, garage and yard.6
TT 115,132-33, 165-68, 171.
It is true that defendants disputed some of these claims. Coleena Norman, the
teenager who lived with the Grays during 2003, testified that J.G. was chained intermittently
over a three-month period and only when adults were not present to prevent him from
running away. TT 423. Jason Kass, another family friend who lived with the Grays, stated
that he saw J.G. chained "very few times." TT 431. He also testified that he never saw
Christina beat or stab J.G.; rather, she only punished him by taking privileges away. TT 432.
He also said that he had never seen Christina place a blanket or towel over J.G.' s head at the
drive in. TT434.
Defendants maintained, both at trial and on appeal, that they honestly believed they
were justified in chaining J.G. to keep him from running away and potentially harming
himself. "[T]he Grays felt they were trying to protect J.G. from harming himself by running
away. The defense argued that the Grays never tried to conceal the fact that they were
chaining J.G. from anyone, including church acquaintances, friends, neighbors, and even
police officers." Aplt. Br. at 24-25. They also argued that part of the reason they believed
they were justified was that Deputy Timpson allegedly gave them permission. Id.
In view of the foregoing, the defendants were not entitled to a lesser-included offense
instruction because the evidence neither supported an acquittal on the charged nor conviction

6

The pillow, for example, was found inside the doghouse in the back yard. TT 168.
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on the lesser. First, the defendants' claim that they believed they were justified does not
negate the mens rea for the crime. As noted above, willful or intentional conduct does not
necessarily involve "an intent to violate the law or to injure another or acquire any
advantage.55 Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1358 n.3. Rather, the defendants needed onlyto intend to
"do the prohibited act," in this case chaining J.G. in the basement. Norton, 2003 UT App 88
at If 20. Thus, even if defendants did not know they were violating the law, they could still be
held accountable for intentionally and knowingly committing the acts that constituted second
degree felony child abuse.
Second, defendants would not have been entitled to an instruction on criminally
negligent child abuse because there was no evidence that they were negligent. As noted
above, a defendant is criminally negligent when he or she fails to perceive a "substantial and
unjustifiable risk [and] . . . the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor's standpoint.55 Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (West 2004). The evidence at
trial did not indicate defendants were unaware of the risk of harm to J.G. from chaining;
rather, they argued that they were justified in chaining J.G. in order to prevent a different
harm. Defendants5 theory has always been that they were blameless because they had no
choice but to chain J.G. This does not entail, however, that they were oblivious to the harm
they were causing to J.G. They simply chose what they afterward claimed was the lesser of

Indeed, it seems impossible that any parent would not be aware of the harm that
could result from chaining a child in the basement on the floor for long periods of time.
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two evils. Accordingly, their actions cannot be merely criminally negligent and they were
not entitled to the lesser-included offense instruction.
C.

Defendants Suffered No Prejudice.

Even assuming arguendo that defendants were entitled to a lesser-included offense
instruction, they suffered no prejudice because, as recounted above, there was ample and
largely unrebutted testimony that their actions in chaining J.G. in the basement were
intentional and knowing. Because "compelling evidence supports the . . . conviction,"
"reversal is inappropriate." See Payne, 964 P.2d at 334; see also Jacques, 924 P.2d at 902
("For an error to require reversal, 'the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently
high to undermine confidence in the verdict.'") (citation omitted). Accordingly, defendants'
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.
n.

DEFENDANTS'
TRIAL
ATTORNEYS
WERE
NOT
INEFFECTIVE IN NOT RETAINING AN EXPERT TO
TESTIFY ABOUT DEFENDANTS' MENTAL STATES.

Defendants claim their trial attorneys were ineffective "for failing to recognize the
need to call [an] expert witness on Mark and Christina's behalf with respect to the element of
'intentionally and knowingly' causing harm to J.G." Aplt. Br. at 37. This claim is also
without merit.
A.

Testimony Concerning Defendants5 Mental States Is Inadmissible.

Defendants' trial attorneys cannot be found deficient for not introducing an expert on
their mental states because such testimony is inadmissible. Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence states unequivocally: "No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state
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or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether
the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the
crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact."
UtahR. Evid. 704(b); see also United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031,1037 (9th Cir.1997)
(identical federal rule 704 prohibits "testimony from which it necessarily follows, if the
testimony is credited, that the defendant did or did not possess the requisite mens red")
(italics in original). As one court stated: "'Courts have interpreted Rule 704(b) to prohibit
both the prosecution and the defense from inquiring of expert psychiatrists whether the
defendant, at the time of the crime, was able to appreciate the wrongfulness or the nature and
quality of his acts.'5' United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 183 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting
United States v. Brown, 32 F.3d 236, 238 (7th Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, defendants cannot
demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice because any attempt to admit such testimony
would have been futile.
B.

Even If the Psychiatrist's Testimony Were Admissible, the Decision
Not to Call an Expert Is a Strategy Decision and, Therefore,
Cannot Establish Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Even if psychiatric expert testimony were admissible, defendants' claim that their
attorneys were ineffective in not calling such an expert is meritless because introducing
expert testimony is a strategic decision within the discretion of counsel.
Defendants claim their trial attorneys should have retained someone like Lawrence D.
Beall, a Ph.D. psychologist and director of the Trauma Awareness & Treatment Center, who
prepared a psychological assessment of both defendants at their behest for sentencing
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purposes.

See MGP 112, CGP 120. According to defendants, "Dr. Beall's overall

assessment of Mark and Christina does not attempt to controvert Dr. Corwin's determination
that chaining is in the realm of psychological abuse/maltreatment, but instead explains how
the chaining could have occurred by the Grays, whom Dr. Beall assessed to have 'no
evidence of malicious intent.5" Aplt. Br. at 35-36 (emphasis added in original).
As noted in section II.A., above, such testimony concerning the defendants' intent is
not admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence. However, some testimony concerning
defendants' mental condition might be admissible for some other purpose. "[Ejxpert
testimony is admissible if it merely ' supports] an inference or conclusion that the defendant
did or did not have the requisite mens rea, so long as the expert does not draw the ultimate
inference or conclusion for the jury and the ultimate inference or conclusion does not
necessarily follow from the testimony.'" United States v. Bennett 161 F.3d 171,183 (3dCir.
1998) (citation omitted), cert, denied 528 U.S. 819 (1999). Thus, assuming defendants could
have fashioned Beall's testimony in a way that did not violate rule 704, some portions of it
may have been admissible.
Nonetheless, even assuming Beall's testimony was admissible, there are a number of
reasons why defendants' trial attorneys cannot be found ineffective. First, defense counsel
generally cannot be found constitutionally deficient for not introducing expert testimony.
"Generally, the selection of witnesses and the introduction of evidence are questions of trial
strategy and virtually unchallengeable." State v. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d 250, 266 (Mo. 1997)
(en banc), cert, denied, 595 U.S. 1095. In assessing the reasonableness of representation, a
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court should consider all circumstances surrounding the attorney's performance. State v.
Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Utah 1993) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90)). Under
Strickland, trial tactics and strategies, including witnesses, objections and defenses are
"within the prerogative of counsel and are generally left to counsel's professional
judgments." Id. at 1256. "Furthermore, counsel's decision to call or not to call an expert
witness is a matter of trial strategy, which will not be questioned and viewed as
ineffectiveness unless there is no reasonable basis for that decision." Id. (citations omitted;
emphasis added); Barkell v. State, 55 P.3d 1239, 1243 (Wyo. 2002) ("The decision not to
call a witness is a strategic choice, normally within the judgment of counsel and will not be
second-guessed with the benefit of hindsight. . ."); see also State v. Hartman, 754 N.E.2d
1150, 1177 (Ohio 2001) (defense counsel's decision to rely on cross-examination of state's
expert instead of calling his own "should be viewed as a legitimate 'tactical decision'...").
Thus, there is strong presumption that defendants' trial attorneys were performing within
constitutional limits in choosing not to call an expert and defendants have not overcome this
presumption.
Second, such testimony from a psychologist would have been cumulative of that
offered by other witnesses. Several other character witnesses, who described the Grays as
loving, caring parents trying to cope with behavioral difficulties of a disturbed child,
implicitly presented defendants' claim that they did not intentionally or knowingly harm J.G.
With regard to the special challenges J.G. presented at his elementary school, the principal
described the Grays as "very good. They recognized the problem." TT 359. "They were
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very responsive to a kid that was in crisis." TT 380. Feleti Matagi, a DCFS evaluator, met
with the Grays in 2003 after J.G. was removed from the home to determine whether the other
children in the home were in danger. TT 391-92. He ultimately recommended that the
remaining children remain in the home. TT 394. A neighbor described Christina Gray as a
normal "stay-at-home mom[]" who treated J.G. just like the other children. TT 447,449-51.
Thus, any additional evidence concerning defendant's intentions for an expert would have
been merely cumulative.
Finally, testimony from an expert that the Grays sincerely believed they had to chain
J.G. for his own good does not negate the intent necessary for commission of second degree
felony child abuse. As argued in section LB., above, the claim that defendants believed they
were justified in chaining J.G. does not mean they did not intentionally or knowingly inflict
serious physical injury upon a child. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2)(a) (second degree
felony child abuse). Moreover, the psychological assessments rarely directly address the
chaining of J.G. and when they do, they generally acknowledge that the chaining was a
mistake. For instance, one of the parenting assessments frankly states: "When a solution
was inferred that seemed like the only feasible one left (i.e., restraints), they used it. As they
have admitted to the evaluator, these restraints were a mistake." Parenting of Mark and
Christina Gray, MGP 112, at p. 2. The report states that Christina Gray felt guilty about the
chaining and quotes her as saying, "I made a mistake when I supported Mark's decision to
use the chain." Id.
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In short, defendants have not overcome the strong presumption that the decision not to
call an expert witness was reasonable trial strategy and, therefore, constitutionally sound.
Accordingly, defendants' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
III.

INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT THE DEGREE OF PROOF
NECESSARY FOR CONVICTION "OBVIATES ALL
REASONABLE DOUBT" DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANTS'
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.

Defendant claims that the reasonable doubt instruction given at his trial violated his
due process rights under the United States Utah Constitutions. See Aplt. Br. at 40. That
reasonable doubt instruction, in compliance with State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah
1997), overruled in relevant part by State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33,116 P.3d 305, informed the
jury that "[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof that satisfies the mind,
convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it, and
obviates all reasonable doubt." Jury Instruction No. 8, MGP 84; CGP 93 (Addendum A).
However, after trial, the Utah Supreme Court "expressly abandoned]" the ""obviate all
reasonable doubt' element of the Robertson test." State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, H 30,116 P.3d
305.
Relying on Reyes, defendant argues that the "risk inherent in the use of the phrase
'obviate all reasonable doubt5" may have led to violation of the defendants' due process
rights. Aplt. Br. at 40. For the reasons set forth below, this argument fails.

28

A.

Because Defendants Approved of the Jury Instruction They Now
Challenge on Appeal, Their Claim Is Invited Error and Should Not
Be Considered.

Because defendants approved the reasonable doubt instruction, they cannot challenge
it on appeal. "[A] party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party
led the trial court into committing the error." State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,1109 (Utah
1996) (internal quotation and citation omitted). "Accordingly, a jury instruction may not be
assigned as error even if such instruction constitutes manifest injustice 'if counsel, either by
statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the
jury instruction.5" State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 9, 86 P.3d 742 (quoting State v.
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54, 70 P.3d 111).
In Geukgeuzian, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed its caselaw and enumerated
several examples of invited error. Id. at \ 10. A defendant invites error when his counsel
"confirm[s] on the record that the defense had no objection to the instructions given by the
trial court." Id. (citing Hamilton, 2003 UT 22 at f 55). A defendant also invites error where
he fails to object to an instruction when asked specifically by the court. Id. (citing Anderson,
929 P.2d at 1108-09) Finally, a defendant invites error when his counsel represents to the
court that she read the instruction and had no objection to it. Id. (citing State v. Medina, 73 8
P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987)).
Similarly, here, defendants invited the alleged error concerning the reasonable doubt
instruction. Before the trial began, defense counsel informed the judge that they had
reviewed the proposed instructions submitted by the State and that "we seem to have been
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playing from the standard play book. Everything t hat I was going to submit is what they've
already submitted so we would stipulate to what they've already given you." TT 1. Then,
toward the trial's conclusion, the judge again reviewed the instruction with both parties. TT
436-444. Defense counsel voiced concern specifically about three instructions—one
concerning the defendants' right not to testify, another about conforming the font to be
consistent throughout and about some minor rewording of one instruction. TT 439-40,443.
Each of these concerns was addressed to defense counsel's satisfaction. TT 444. Following
a final discussion with counsel for the State and the defense, the judge made a concluding
query: "[I]f anyone has any objections to the instructions, speak up now or forever hold your
peace. I don't hear anything." TT 463.
Clearly, defense counsel "confirmed on the record that the defense had no objection to
the instructions given by the trial court." Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16 at ^f 10, (citing
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22 at If 55). Thus, any error was invited and defendants cannot challenge
the reasonable doubt instruction on appeal.
B.

Defendants' Reyes Claim Is Unpreserved and Does Not Constitute
"Exceptional Circumstances."

Defendants' Reyes challenge is not properly before this Court. "As a general rule,
claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000
UT 74, H 11, 10 P.3d 346. "Utah courts require specific objections in order to 'bring all
claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the
errors if appropriate.'" State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244,11 14,54 P.3d 645 (quoting State v.
Brown, 856P.2d358,361 (UtahApp. 1993)). To preserve a claim, a defendant must specify
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the alleged error so that the trial court can "'assess [the] allegations by isolating relevant
facts and considering them in the context of the specific legal doctrine placed at issue.'" Id.
at U 15 (quoting Brown, 856 P.2d at 361). "[T]he preservation rule applies to every claim,
including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional
circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at U 11. The
exceptional circumstances exception is "ill-defmed . . . and applies primarily to rare
procedural anomalies." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n. 3 (Utah 1993).
Defendants concede that trial counsel did not preserve the issue they raise. See Aplt.
Br. at 40. However, they argue that the fact that Reyes was not decided until after their trial
constitutes an exceptional circumstance excusing their failure to preserve the claim. See
Aplt. Br. at 41. In effect, they argue that they could not object at trial, because the basis for
the objection did not yet exist.
This very argument was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Lopez, 886
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994). Lopez was tried for sex crimes against a child. On appeal, he
argued that a photo array was impermissibly suggestive under state due process principles
announced in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1113. At trial,
Lopez had not objected on this ground, as Ramirez had not yet been decided. Id. On appeal,
the supreme court had to "determine whether Lopez may now raise that issue on appeal." Id.
The court held that "Lopez cannot raise the issue of state due process for the first time on
appeal because he has not demonstrated that the 'plain error" or 'exceptional circumstances'
exceptions exist." Id.
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The case at bar is indistinguishable. Nothing prevented defendants from challenging
the reasonable doubt instruction even before Reyes was decided. In Reyes itself, the State
argued that the Robertson three-part test was unconstitutional, despite the absence of any
authority declaring it unconstitutional. Moreover, this Court, in an opinion issued before
defendants' trial, described the Robertson three-part test as "constitutionally flawed" and
"not consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent." See State v. Reyes, 2004 UT
o

App 8,ffif22,30, 84 P.3d 841.° Nothing prevented defendants from preserving this issue by
making this argument at trial. Accordingly, the claim is barred.9
C.

Defendants' Reyes Challenge Fails Because the Prosecutor Did Not
Argue that the State Needed To Refute Only "Doubts That Are
Sufficiently Defined."

Even if defendants' claim were reviewable by this Court, it still lacks merit because
the due process danger identified in the Reyes opinion did not arise here.
The reasonable doubt instruction given at trial, reproduced here in its entirety,
contained the phrase "obviates all reasonable doubt":
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of
innocence, and defendants are presumed innocent until they are proved guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. And, incase of a reasonable doubt as to whether
his or her guilt is satisfactorily shown, he or she [is] entitled to an acquittal.

This Court issued Reyes on January 15,2004. Defendants were tried in September
2004.
9

Defendant does not claim that this Court can review his challenge to the reasonable
doubt instruction because the error was structural. See Br. Aplt. at 37-41. Whether failure to
object to a reasonable doubt instruction forecloses a claim of structural error is a question the
supreme court left unresolved in State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, % 18, 122 P.3d 543.
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I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State to prove the
defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt does not require proof to an absolute certainty. Now by reasonable
doubt is meant a doubt that is based on reason and one which is reasonable in
view of all the evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt that is
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative possibility.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof that satisfies the mind,
convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously
upon it, and obviates all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that
reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from the
evidence of the lack of the evidence in this case.

MGP 84; CGP 93 (emphasis added) (Addendum A).
The Reyes court found the "'obviate all reasonable doubt'" concept to be "[ijnsightful
and important," yet "linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect." Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at
1126.
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of
proof necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor [v. Nebraska,
511 U.S. 1 (1994),] standard. The "obviation" of doubt contemplates a
two-step undertaking: the identification of the doubt and a testing of the
validity of the doubt against the evidence. This process suggests a back and
forth disputation of a doubt's merits, all to the end of determining whether the
evidence is sufficient to "obviate" the doubt. The "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard does not, however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is
reasonable on an ability either to articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it.
Id. at II 27. The court concluded, "[t]o the extent that the Robertson 'obviate' test would
permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test
works to improperly diminish the State's burden." Id. at U 28.
Reyes thus holds that the "obviate test" diminishes the State's constitutional burden of
proof only to the extent it would "permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts
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that are sufficiently defined." Id. Consequently, where the State does not argue that it need
only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test does not diminish the State's
constitutional burden.
Defendants here do not claim, nor does the record disclose, that the prosecutor argued
that the State need obviate only those doubts that are "sufficiently defined." See Aplt. Br. at
37-41. In fact, the prosecutor never discussed the burden of proof at all during his opening
or closing arguments. See TT 14-17,482-86, 502-510. Even when reviewing the elements
instruction, the prosecutor never discusses reasonable doubt or makes any reference to the
State's burden of proof. Clearly, the prosecutor did not argue that the State need not refute
any doubts because they were not "sufficiently defined." Reyes, 2005 UT 33, II 28.
Defendant's claim fails for another reason. "[S]o long as the reasonable doubt
instructions, 'taken as a whole,... correctly convey[ ] the concept of reasonable doubt to the
jury,' they pass constitutional muster." State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, II 20, 122 P.3d 543
(quoting Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1,22 (1994)). "Simply put, [the court] need only ask
whether the instructions, taken as a whole, correctly communicate the principle of reasonable
doubt, namely, that a defendant cannot be convicted of a crime 'except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.5"
Id. at H 21 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). In Cruz, the supreme court
approved a reasonable doubt instruction containing the sentence, "The law does not require
that the evidence dispel all possible or conceivable doubt, but rather that it dispel all
reasonable doubt." Id. at If 11. In the context of reasonable doubt instructions, "dispel" and
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"obviate" are synonyms. So in effect, the Cruz jury, like the jury here, was told that the State
must "obviate all reasonable doubt." Yet the Supreme Court approved the instruction.
The jury instructions here "pass constitutional muster" because, "taken as a whole,"
they "correctly convey [ed] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury." Cruz, 2005 UT 45,
If 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This concept was conveyed not only
by the reasonable doubt instruction quoted above, but also by others. See, e.g„ Jury
Instruction No. 2 (CGP 86) ("The plea of not guilty denies each and all of the essential
allegations of the charge contained in the Information and casts upon the State the burden of
proving each and all of the essential allegations thereof to your satisfaction and beyond a
reasonable doubt."); Jury Instruction No. 14 (CGP 99) ("If, after careful consideration of all
the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one of the
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant Christina L.
Gray, guilty of Child Abuse as charged in the information. If, on the other hand, you are not
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you
must find her not guilty.").
In sum, even if defendants' claims were not waived, they fails on the merits.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the defendants' conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisSfl%y of December, 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

«3vx^vQjiA^
BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

INSTRUCTION NO.
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